We examined the extent to which organizations' reputations encompass different types of stakeholders' perceptions, which may have differential effects on economic outcomes. Specifically, we propose that reputation consists of two dimensions: (1) stakeholders' perceptions of an organization as able to produce quality goods and (2) organizations' prominence in the minds of stakeholders. We empirically examined the distinct antecedents and consequences of these two dimensions of reputation in the context of U.S. business schools. Results suggest that prominence, which derives from the choices of influential third parties vis-à -vis an organization, contributes significantly to the price premium associated with having a favorable reputation.
The concept of reputation, defined as stakeholders' perceptions about an organization's ability to create value relative to competitors, has received considerable attention from organizational scholars (Deephouse, 2000; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Hall, 1992 Hall, , 1993 Martins, 1998) . Reputation is viewed as a valuable intangible asset that provides a firm with sustainable competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Hall, 1992) because it influences stakeholders' economic choices vis-à -vis the organization (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; Deephouse, 2000) and contributes to differences in organizational performance. Indeed, numerous studies have documented a positive relationship between a firm's reputation and its financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Podolny, 1993; Roberts & Dowling, 2002) .
Whereas this research has demonstrated unambiguously that a favorable organizational reputation is associated with economic benefits, it offers a less clear picture of what reputation actually is and how it is formed. A review of extant research on organizational reputation in management, economics, sociology, and marketing reveals that two schools of thought inform the construct's definition. Scholars studying reputation from an economics perspective tend to define it as the observers' expectations or estimations of a particular attribute of an organization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) , especially the organization's ability to produce quality products (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 1983) . According to this perspective, reputation forms on the basis of past actions, through which firms signal to stakeholders their "true" attributes (Clark & Montgomery, 1998; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) .
A different perspective is presented by scholars who draw on institutional theory to understand reputation (Rao, 1994) . These scholars tend to characterize it as a global impression, which represents how a collective-a stakeholder group or multiple stakeholder groups-perceive a firm (Fombrun, 1996; Hall, 1992; Rao, 1994) . According to this perspective, reputation forms as a result of information exchanges and social influence among var-ious actors interacting in an organizational field (Rao, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) . 1 The different ways in which scholars working from economics or institutional perspectives view reputation suggest that research on this topic can be advanced by greater integration of the conceptualization of the construct. In this article, we integrate these two perspectives by proposing that they represent two distinct dimensions of reputation. The economics perspective addresses how stakeholders evaluate a particular organizational attribute; therefore, it emphasizes the perceived quality dimension of organizational reputation. In contrast, the institutional perspective is concerned with the collective awareness and recognition that an organization has accumulated in its organizational field; therefore, it emphasizes the prominence dimension of organizational reputation. Conceptualizing organizational reputation as consisting of two interrelated but distinct dimensions advances reputation research by providing greater conceptual clarity about what reputation is, how it is built, and how it influences organizational economic outcomes.
Drawing on work conducted from both the economics and institutional perspectives, we develop and test a model of the antecedents and consequences of these two dimensions of organizational reputation. We propose that perceived quality is influenced by the signals that organizations send when they make strategic choices about the resources deployed in producing products and services. Conversely, prominence is influenced by the choices that influential third parties, such as institutional intermediaries and high-status actors, make vis-à-vis organizations (Deephouse, 2000; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rao, 1994; Stuart, 2000) .
In addition, our study advances reputation research by examining several alternative models that specify different sets of relationships among the antecedents and consequences of reputation. The development and testing of such alternative models is important because scholars have argued that the creation of reputation is causally ambiguous (Barney, 1991) . By comparing the alternative models to the hypothesized model, we provide greater theoretical clarity about how reputation is built.
We empirically investigated these relationships in the context of U.S. business schools with fulltime MBA programs. We focused on the effect of business schools' reputations on corporate recruiters, who seek to reduce uncertainty about the quality of business school graduates as potential employees. Because the quality of MBA graduates is difficult to evaluate a priori, business schools' reputations are likely to strongly influence recruiters' demand for MBA graduates. Therefore, the context of our study is particularly appropriate for examining the dimensions, antecedents, and consequences of reputation.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Perspectives on Organizational Reputation
Organizational scholars studying reputation recognize that reputation is valuable because it reduces the uncertainty stakeholders face in evaluating firms as potential suppliers of needed products and services (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) . Scholars working from different theoretical perspectives, however, differ in their explanations of how reputation reduces stakeholder uncertainty. Those studying reputation from an economics perspective view uncertainty as a function of the information asymmetries between competing firms and their stakeholders. Firms reduce information asymmetries, and thus market uncertainty, when they make choices that reveal their "true" attributes. Such choices serve as signals that enable buyers to assess relevant firm attributes, such as whether a firm is a producer of high-or low-quality goods (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Shapiro, 1983) . Therefore, from an economics perspective, reputation reduces stakeholders' concerns about the quality of firms' products, thus, inducing them to pay price premiums for firms' products, which in turn positively influences organizations' economic outcomes (Shapiro, 1982 (Shapiro, , 1983 .
Scholars that embrace an institutional perspective on reputation maintain that the uncertainty about the "true" attributes of firms is reduced through the exchange of information among diverse actors in an organizational field. In an organizational field, they argue, certain actors, such as institutional intermediaries and high-status actors, have superior ability to access or disseminate information by virtue of their institutional roles or structural positions (Rao, 1998; Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001) . Stakeholders closely watch the choices of such actors because of their perceived superiority in evaluating firms (Rao, 1998; Stuart, 2000) . As a result, the actions of these actors introduce systematic disparities in the availability of information about different organizations, thereby making some more salient and central in the public mind (Rao et al., 2001; Zuckerman, 1999) . For example, Pollock and Rindova (2003) showed that the volume of media coverage a firm receives is positively related to the performance of its initial public offering (IPO). Similarly, Zuckerman (1999) showed that whether or not a particular analyst covers a firm affects how investors value it. Overall, the information conveyed through the choices of influential third parties vis-à-vis organizations decouples the reputation-building process from the strategic signals of competing firms (Rao, 1994) and makes some firms more prominent in their organizational fields (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) . The institutional perspective, therefore, suggests that the extent to which an organization is widely recognized among stakeholders in its organizational field, and the extent to which it stands out relative to competitors, may be an important dimension of organizational reputation.
These two perspectives on organizational reputation have shaped the definitions of the construct in the fields of management, economics, sociology, and marketing. Reviewing over 60 studies using the construct of organizational reputation in these fields, we observed that scholars tend to define reputation either as specific assessments of a relevant attribute (e.g. ability to produce quality), as the economics perspective suggests, or as collective knowledge about and recognition of a firm, as the institutional perspective suggests. Table 1 summarizes the definitions of reputation across these studies, highlighting which perspective on reputation they espouse in column 3.
Comparing the similarities and differences in the definitions of reputation in extant research, we propose that organizational reputation can be conceptualized as comprising two dimensions: (1) a perceived quality dimension, which captures the degree to which stakeholders evaluate an organization positively on a specific attribute, such as ability to produce quality products, and (2) a prominence dimension, which captures the degree to which an organization receives large-scale collective recognition in its organizational field.
These two dimensions of reputation are likely to have different antecedents. Organizations' strategic choices regarding the resources used to produce goods and services are likely to influence perceptions of quality because organizational strategic choices convey information about organizations' underlying capabilities to produce quality products (Barney, 1991; Moran & Ghoshal, 1999) . In contrast, the choices of influential third parties-such as institutional intermediaries and high-status actors, whose attention to or affiliation with organizations may be seen as a form of endorsement-are likely to influence prominence (Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rao, 1998; Stuart, 2000) . Figure 1 depicts the relationships between (1) the resource signals emitted by an organization and its perceived quality and (2) certifications from institutional intermediaries and affiliation with high-status actors, and prominence. The model further suggests that perceived quality impacts prominence and that each dimension of reputation directly influences an organization's economic payoffs.
Antecedents of Perceived Quality
To evaluate the quality they can expect from a provider of goods, stakeholders rely on signals that reveal the unobservable attributes that affect the ability of a firm to produce quality products (Shapiro, 1982 (Shapiro, , 1983 . Although economists stress that "uncertainty about quality is a widespread and important feature of markets for most firms' goods and services" (Shapiro, 1982: 20) , products and services differ in the amount of uncertainty about quality they present buyers with. The more difficult it is for customers to assess product quality prior to purchase, the more they are likely to rely on strategic signals to form expectations about quality. In particular, customers are likely to rely on signals of quality when the products they are purchasing can only be evaluated with use and over time, or require high levels of specialized expertise to evaluate. Examples of such products and services include new production technologies, custom-built information systems, and legal or management consulting. When customers find product quality difficult to evaluate prior to purchase, they may use the quality of inputs and/or the quality of the productive assets a firm uses to convert inputs into outputs to form expectations about the quality of the final product.
The inputs an organization uses in its production process can signal quality because they affect the quality of products (Barney, 1991; Moran & Ghoshal, 1999) . To provide stakeholders with reliable signals of quality, the strategic choices of firms must be costly and unavailable to all competitors (Ippolito, 1990) . The acquisition and use of highquality inputs is costly and not common to all competitors (Barney, 1986; Ippolito, 1990; Shapiro, 1983) and therefore can provide stakeholders with signals that influence perceived quality. Intel Inside and Nutrasweet are examples of input brands used by PC and soft-drink manufacturers, respectively, to signal the quality of their own products. Drawing on this logic, we hypothesize: Hypothesis 1. The higher the quality of the inputs that an organization uses in its production or service delivery processes, the higher its perceived product quality.
The quality of the productive assets of a firm, and especially the quality of its knowledge assets, can also be used as a signal of quality. For example, Kotha (2001: 1269) reported that Excite attempted to signal the quality of its Web site content by introducing "personality-driven reviews" offered by a team of journalists who were nationally renowned experts in their areas. Similarly, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) suggested that top-notch scientists in biotechnology firms signal the quality of the firms' research capability to stakeholders. These arguments suggest that the quality of the productive assets an organization uses will influence the perceived quality dimension of its reputation. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. The higher the quality of the productive assets that an organization uses in its production or service delivery processes, the higher its perceived product quality. Herbig & Milewicz (1995) Consumers' impressions of a company that is producing and selling a given product or brand
Collective knowledge and recognition Goldberg & Hartwick (1990) Perceptions and beliefs about a firm based on previous interactions
Assessments of a relevant attribute(s)
Campbell ( 
Antecedents of Prominence
Whereas the resource choices of organizations convey information that stakeholders can use to make inferences about their abilities to produce quality, the choices and opinions of third parties vis-à-vis these organizations may influence their prominence. This is because under conditions of uncertainty individuals look to the opinions and choices of others to make up their own minds (Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000; Rao et al., 2001) . As a result, the formation of public opinion tends to follow a "social influence" logic, leading some organizations to gain disproportionate amounts of public attention and support on the basis of rather general and nonspecific impressions and beliefs (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999) . Such organizations become prominent within their organizational field and may be preferred as suppliers of goods, even in the absence of stakeholders' specific judgments about their ability to produce quality goods.
Two types of actors-institutional intermediaries and high-status actors (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999; Rao et al., 2001 )-are likely to have a particularly strong influence on an organization's prominence. Institutional intermediaries are entities that specialize in disseminating information about organizations or in evaluating their outputs (Fombrun, 1996; Rao, 1998) . By virtue of their specialization in collecting and disseminating information, institutional intermediaries are likely to be viewed as having superior access to information and/or expertise in evaluating organizations (Rao, 1998) . Further, the information and evaluations provided by institutional intermediaries about an organization tend to be distributed more broadly than the opinions of the average stakeholder. As a result, they are likely to have a high degree of influence on which organizations become prominent in the minds of stakeholders. Both general and expert intermediaries may influence prominence. General intermediaries (e.g., the media) are those that provide general information on a broad set of issues, while expert intermediaries (e.g., Moody's Investor Services debt ratings) are those providing technical evaluations and certifications that often require specialized expertise (Fombrun, 1996) .
The media are a type of general intermediary whose impact on stakeholders' perceptions derives primarily from their ability to focus public attention on the issues and entities that they select to report on (Deephouse, 2000; Pollock & Rindova, 2003) . In recent years media organizations have also begun to offer stakeholders direct evaluations of organizations in the form of various rankings and ratings. For example, Fortune's list "America's Most Admired Corporations" has become a widely monitored measure of organizational reputation (Roberts & Dowling, 2002) . Media rankings have
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also become an important factor in determining the reputations of business schools (Gioia & Corley, 2002; Martins, 1998) . Although the media often seek to position their rankings as evaluations of quality, empirical tests of such rankings show that they tend to be rather noisy and inconsistent indicators of quality (Dichev, 1999) . This finding is not surprising given that ratings and rankings collapse the diverse and complex information necessary to evaluate organizational quality into a single number. However, it is precisely this synoptic nature of rankings that may cause them to have a strong impact on an organization's prominence. By offering ready-made evaluations of organizations' relative standings, media rankings reduce stakeholders' need to evaluate the attributes and quality of an organization directly (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) . As a result, stakeholders can use media rankings as an overall indicator of whether an organization is among the top in its industry. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. The higher an organization's position in media rankings, the greater its prominence in the minds of stakeholders.
Expert intermediaries are also likely to impact the prominence of organizations. Although some expert intermediaries do offer direct evaluations of product quality (e.g., Consumer Reports), many more are likely to impact the prominence of organizations by certifying their level of achievement relative to explicit or implicit standards of excellence in a given field. Since expert intermediaries subject organizations to rigorous scrutiny using the specialized knowledge that is necessary to evaluate the more complex aspects of organizational operations and outputs, few organizations receive such certifications from expert intermediaries, and those that do tend to stand out among their industry competitors. For example, the Baldrige award and ISO 9000 status certify a level of quality achievement in business as determined by third-party panels of experts. In the field of science, publications in premier scholarly journals certify the degree to which scientists produce knowledge that is novel, objective, and cumulative and therefore, satisfies the institutional norms associated with modern science (Clemens, Powell, McIlwaine, & Okamoto, 1995; Merton, 1972) . Because of the rigorous scrutiny to which expert intermediaries subject scientific research, very few scientists receive such certification. Receiving certification of achievement from expert intermediaries increases the visibility of the few organizations that meet the standards of expert intermediaries, causing stakeholders to view these organizations as being among the top in their industry. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. The greater the extent to which expert intermediaries provide an organization with certifications of achievement, the greater its prominence in the minds of stakeholders.
Affiliation with high-status actors may also increase organizational prominence. Affiliation with high-status actors increases prominence because such affiliation enables stakeholders to assume that the high-status actors, who are believed to be well informed, have evaluated the organization positively (Stuart, 2000) . High-status actors themselves tend to garner a disproportionate amount of attention within their organizational fields (Rao et al., 2000) . As a result, affiliation with them may generate positive spillover effects (Stuart et al., 1999) , such as "basking in reflected glory," which refers to the transfer of a positive evaluation from one social object to another (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976) . Thus, ties to high-status actors are likely to enhance the prominence of an organization, leading us to hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5. The greater the extent of an organization's affiliation with high-status actors, the greater its prominence in the minds of stakeholders.
The Relationship between Perceived Quality and Prominence
In the preceding sections we have argued that perceived quality and prominence are two distinct dimensions of organizational reputation that also have different antecedents. These two dimensions, however, are likely to be related because they reflect a common stakeholder concern with identifying providers of high-quality goods. The prominence dimension of reputation reflects the degree to which opinions about an organization's ability to produce quality and create value are disseminated among its stakeholders. Opinions about an organization disseminate throughout its organizational field not only through the actions and choices of intermediaries, but also through the purchasing behaviors and opinion statements of various stakeholders themselves (Nayyar, 1990; Rogerson, 1983) . As a result, organizations that customers perceive as having high quality are likely to be mentioned or patronized more frequently, leading more customers to choose them in the future. The aggregate of these choices makes such organizations more widely recognized within their organizational field (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999) . Therefore, customer per-ceptions of quality can contribute to an increase in an organization's prominence, leading us to hypothesize:
Hypothesis 6. The higher the perceived product quality of an organization, the greater its prominence in the minds of stakeholders.
Reputation and Price Premium
Because reputation reduces stakeholder uncertainty about the value of future exchanges, favorable reputation can induce buyers to pay a price premium (Rao & Monroe, 1996; Shapiro, 1983 ). As we argued earlier, both prominence and perceived quality reduce buyers' uncertainty, but they do so through different mechanisms. Perceived quality is likely to have a positive effect on the prices that customers are willing to pay because it increases their confidence in the quality of an organization's goods. Higher prices serve as an assurance that a producer organization has no incentives to increase its profits by reducing investments that lead to quality products (Shapiro, 1983) . According to Shapiro, the price premium that producers with reputations for quality can charge can be viewed "either as a return on reputation or as an incentive payment to induce quality maintenance" (1983: 661). Thus, on the basis of extant theory, we predict that perceived quality is associated with higher price premiums.
Hypothesis 7. The higher the perceived product quality of an organization, the higher the price premiums associated with its products.
Prominence reduces stakeholder uncertainty through "social proof" (Rao et al., 2000 (Rao et al., , 2001 , because it reflects the collective recognition of an organization in its organizational field. When making economic choices, stakeholders are likely to favor prominent organizations because prominence reflects the "majority vote," which can provide some assurance to both buyers and others evaluating the buyers' choices (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) . For example, buyers may be willing to pay premium prices for the products of prominent organizations because acquiring such products can enhance their image with their own customers (Podolny, 1994) . In addition, prominence may lead to a higher price premium by simply increasing the number of people bidding for the goods an organization produces. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 8. The greater the prominence of an organization, the higher the price premiums associated with its products.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
The sample used for this study included 107 U.S. business schools rated by 1,600 corporate recruiters who completed an online survey about business school reputations administered by Harris Interactive in 2000. The sample was generated from the 344 schools accredited as of March 2000 by the International Association for Management Education. Small schools (those with fewer than 50 fulltime MBA graduates in their class of 2000) were eliminated because such organizations have been shown to have goals and resource constraints that differ from those of larger organizations (Aldrich, 2000) . This criterion produced an initial sample of 188 schools that were asked to provide names and contact information for corporate recruiters that had recruited from them. Recruiters were contacted by e-mail and regular mail and invited to participate in the online survey. On the survey recruiters were asked to rate up to three MBA programs and to select schools that they had either recruited from, had some interaction with, or had some degree of familiarity with. Of the recruiters who completed the survey, more than 80 percent had hired students from and/or had contacts with the schools they rated in the previous two years, suggesting there had been sufficient opportunity for them to develop perceptions about these schools (Clark & Montgomery, 1998) . Although business schools provided the contact information and/or contacted the recruiters directly, they had no control over which schools a recruiter nominated. The nomination procedure produced recruiter ratings for 107 business schools, which constituted the final sample for this study.
Dependent Variables
Measures of reputation. One shortcoming of extant reputation research is that organizational reputation is seldom measured directly. It is common for researchers to infer the unobservable effects of reputation by examining direct relationships between observable organizational attributes or thirdparty actions and organizational performance outcomes (e.g., Rao, 1994; Shamsie, 2003; Stuart, 2000) . In order to understand how reputation creates value, however, one needs to examine the specific effects of the different aspects of stakeholder perceptions that make up reputation. In this study, we overcame limitations of previous research by developing direct measures of the two dimensions of organizational reputation.
Prominence. Prominence was measured by the number of recruiters that nominated a given school. Recall that recruiters were invited to select three schools they would like to rate. We reasoned that since corporate recruiters are bounded by both cognitive and time constraints (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) , they were likely to choose to rate those schools that were most prominent in their minds. Regardless of the individual reasons that led each recruiter to select a particular school, across the 1,600 recruiters who completed the survey, this nomination procedure captured the relative prominence of business schools among corporate recruiters as a stakeholder group. The prominence measure derived through this nomination procedure is the only measure of reputation that we are aware of that captures the collective-level properties of reputation (Rao, 1994) and allows for the distinction between prominence and quality evaluations as two distinct dimensions.
Perceived quality. Perceived quality was measured, on a scale of 1 to 10, as the average of recruiters' ratings of a school on 13 attributes related to student quality (see Appendix A for a list of the attributes). The Cronbach's alpha for the measure of perceived quality was .98. Because the unit of analysis for this study was the organization, the perceived quality score for each school was calculated as the average of the individual scores of all recruiters who rated that school. Ninety-two schools were ranked by more than one recruiter. Across the schools with multiple raters (two or more), the mean interrater agreement (r wg ) for the 13 attribute items was .95, suggesting a high level of similarity in recruiters' perceptions of each school's quality.
Price premium. Price premium was measured by the mean starting base salary, not including bonuses or other benefits, received by each school's MBA graduates in 2000, as reported in U.S. News & World Report (2001) .
2 This is an objective measure of recruiters' economic choices vis-à-vis different schools. This measure was adjusted for cost-of-living differences among geographic regions by multiplying each school's mean starting base salary by the U.S. Department of Commerce Census Bureau's (2000) cost-of-living index score for that school's geographic region.
Independent Variables
Quality of inputs. In the educational process of an MBA program, incoming students constitute the major resource input (D'Aveni, 1996) . Schools' application of different admission criteria leads to differences in the quality of inputs for their educational processes (D'Aveni, 1996) . One of the main admission criteria is applicants' scores on standardized scholastic aptitude tests, such as the GMAT. Therefore, we measured quality of inputs as the average GMAT scores of students entering MBA programs in 1998 and 1999, as reported in U.S. News & World Report.
Quality of productive assets. The main productive asset employed in the educational process of a business school is its faculty (Trieschmann, Dennis, Northcraft, & Niemi, 2000) . Faculty embody the knowledge that is transferred to students in the educational process (Feldman, 1987) . Therefore, the more knowledgeable faculty are, the greater their value as a productive asset. Job experience has been identified as an important source of knowledge acquisition and development of the embedded relationships and routines that enable individuals to better perform job tasks such as teaching (Quinones, Ford, & Teachout, 1995; Tierney & Farmer, 2002) . Thus, although faculty quality has many different facets, it is logical to expect that academic experience will be positively related to the ability of faculty to convey the knowledge they have acquired to students. Based on this logic, we measured the quality of productive assets as the average number of years of academic experience possessed by a business school's faculty. To compute this measure for each school, we generated a data set of over 9,000 full-time faculty employed in the 107 business schools in our sample. The average level of academic experience for each school was calculated as the average number of years prior to 2000 that had elapsed since the members of the full-time faculty employed by a business school had received their Ph.D. degrees.
Media rankings. A business school's rank in BusinessWeek's 1998 rankings was used to measure media rankings. We used the BusinessWeek ranking because it is the oldest and best-established ranking of U.S. business schools and has been used by multiple prior studies (D'Aveni, 1996; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Martins, 1998; Segev, Raveh, & Farjoun, 1999) . In addition, the BusinessWeek rankings were more appropriate for our study then those published in other media sources, such as the Financial Times or U.S. News & World Report, because the latter include observable organizational attributes and economic outcomes (such as starting salary). 3 We used the 1998 BusinessWeek rankings because this was the most recent Business Week listing at the time the recruiters completed the survey. For the ranked schools, we used their actual position (e.g., first, second, third), and we assigned a constant to the unranked schools.
Expert intermediary certifications. Publications in premier scholarly journals certify that a faculty's research satisfies the institutional norms of modern science (Clemens et al., 1995; Merton, 1972) . We measured faculty publications in premier journals as the sum of the total number of publications of the faculty of a business school over the five years (1996 -2000) prior to the survey. We captured faculty publications in two forms: (1) research publications in premier research journals and (2) publications in well-established practitioner journals (see Appendix B for a full list of journals). The list used by Financial Times and agreed upon by AACSB member schools was used in selecting relevant journals. 4 We calculated the number of faculty publications in research and practitioner journals for each school by adding all the publications authored by the faculty members at a particular school.
Affiliation with high-status actors. Faculties' doctorates from prestigious universities provide the business schools that employ them with an indirect affiliation with these universities. Obtaining a degree from a prestigious academic institution enables faculty to accumulate scholastic, social, and symbolic capital and to gain access to professional opportunities not available to others (Keith & Babchuk, 1998; Long, Bowers, Barnett, & White, 1998) . The symbolic capital associated with degree prestige can also transfer to the business school employing the degree holder (Zuckerman, 1988) . To compute this measure for each school, we used the Gourman Report (Gourman, 1997) to assign a Ph.D. degree-prestige score to each professor employed by a given school and then creating a school score by averaging the individual faculty scores. This procedure produced a single continuous score ranging from 0 to 5 for each school. The Gourman Report has been well established as a measure of the prestige of academic institutions in past research (Cable & Murray, 1999; Williamson & Cable, 2003) , and it is considered the only numerical rating of the prestige of virtually every university in the United States.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Analysis
To simultaneously test the proposed relationships in our model, we used measured variable path analysis in LISREL 8.53 (Jö reskog & Sö rbom, 2001) , which allows researchers to simultaneously examine a series of dependence relationships, such as those hypothesized in our model, while also analyzing multiple dependent variables (Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004) . LISREL provides both an overall assessment of the fit of a hypothesized path model to data and tests of individual hypotheses. This statistical technique also allowed us to compare the fit of alternative models to that of the hypothesized model.
The hypothesized model, which is depicted in Figure 1 , consisted of five exogenous variables and three endogenous variables. Each variable was modeled as a single indicator and assumed to contain no measurement error with the exception of the perceived quality variable, which was measured using a Likert-type survey instrument, thus allowing for the calculation of a reliability coefficient. Following the procedures recommended by James, Mulaik, and Brett (1982) , we controlled for measurement error in perceived quality by setting the variable's error term equal to its variance multiplied by one minus its Cronbach alpha score (.98) and setting the variable's lambda matrix value equal to the square root of its Cronbach alpha score. Prior research suggested that faculty degree prestige, publications in premier journals, media rankings, and GMAT scores were likely to be intercorrelated (D'Aveni, 1996; Trieschmann et al., 2000) . Thus, these exogenous variables were allowed to covary in the estimation of the model.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables are presented in Table 2 . We computed these correlations via a fully saturated LISREL model. We assessed overall fit of the model to the data using chi-square and the goodness-of-fit, normed fit, comparative fit, and incremental fit indexes (the GFI, NFI, CFI, and IFI). The chi-square statistic is well known to be oversensitive to sample size; it will be significant in large samples (sug-gesting inadequate model fit) even when the differences between observed and model-implied covariances are slight (Kline, 1998) . Researchers recommend evaluating model fit by using a rule of thumb whereby the model chi-square value divided by degrees of freedom is lower than 3 (Kline, 1998) . Fit indexes at or above .90 further indicate acceptable fit (Medsker, Williams, & Holahan, 1994) . Our results with all these tests supported the conclusion that the hypothesized model had adequate fit to the data ( 2 [14, n ϭ 107] ϭ 30.36, p Ͻ .05; 2 /df ϭ 2.17; GFI ϭ .93, NFI ϭ .95, CFI ϭ .98, IFI ϭ .98). Figure 2 contains the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the main predictors, significance levels, and proportions of explained variance (R 2 s) for the hypothesized model. 5 First, we discuss the results for the hypothesized predictors of business schools' reputations. In terms of the effects of resource signals on perceived quality, supporting Hypothesis 1, student GMAT scores were statistically significant, positive predictors of perceived quality (␥ ϭ .33). Hypothesis 2 predicts that the average years of academic experience of a business school's faculty has a positive relationship with perceived quality. However, faculty experience was not significantly related to perceived quality. 5 The R 2 s presented in the model are equivalent to one minus the disturbance for each endogenous variable and reflect the proportion of explained variance (Kline, 1998) . 
FIGURE 2 Path Coefficients for the Hypothesized Model
In terms of the effects of institutional intermediaries on prominence, supporting Hypothesis 3, media rankings significantly predicted prominence (␥ ϭ Ϫ.51). Because we used the actual ranks in our data set (e.g., first, second, third), the negative coefficient should be interpreted to mean that business schools that had higher ranks were more prominent than business schools that had lower ranks. As predicted by Hypothesis 4, faculty publications in premier journals were significant, positive predictors of prominence (␥ ϭ .17). Finally, as predicted by Hypothesis 5, faculty degree prestige was significantly, positively related to prominence (␥ ϭ .18).
Next, we present the results for the hypothesized effects of perceived quality on prominence and of the two reputation dimensions on price premium. The path from perceived quality to prominence was positive and significant (␤ ϭ .13), supporting Hypothesis 6. Perceived quality was not significantly related to price premium; thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. Last, as predicted by Hypothesis 8, prominence had a significant, positive relationship with price premium (␤ ϭ .59).
Given that the goal of our study was to examine the system of relationships between the antecedents, dimensions, and consequences of business schools' reputations, it is informative to examine the total (direct plus indirect) effects of the hypothesized predictors on perceived quality, prominence, and price premium. Prominence had the largest significant effect on price premium (.59). Media rankings had the largest significant effect on prominence (Ϫ.51), as well as a significant total effect on price premium (Ϫ.30). Publications in premier journals had a significant total effect on prominence (.17), but no significant total effect on price premium. Faculty degree prestige had a statistically significant total effect on prominence (.18) and a statistically significant total effect on price premium (.11). Perceived quality did not have a significant total effect on price premium, although it did have a significant direct effect on prominence. These findings suggest that in terms of MBA salaries, business schools may benefit more from overall stakeholder recognition than from recruiters' direct perceptions of student quality; one should keep in mind, however, that perceived quality and recognition are positively related. Neither of the resource signals we examined (GMAT or faculty experience) had significant total effects on price premium; however, GMAT scores had a significant effect on perceived quality (.33), suggesting that the quality of the students schools admit influences recruiters' perceptions of quality.
Alternative Model Evaluation
Both Medsker and colleagues (1994) and Hayduk (1987) recommended evaluating a hypothesized model relative to plausible alternative models. In the present study, four alternative models appeared to present logical alternatives to the hypothesized system of relationships. First, we predicted that organizational resource signals would influence perceived quality and that third-party certifications and affiliation with high-status actors would influence prominence. However, it is conceivable that organizational signals and third-party factors influence both perceived quality and prominence (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) . We tested this alternative model 1 by adding links from GMAT and faculty experience to prominence and adding links from media rankings, faculty publications, and faculty degree prestige to perceived quality. Second, in the hypothesized model, organizational and thirdparty effects are predicted to influence price premium only indirectly, through their effects on the two dimensions of reputation. However, reputation may only partially mediate these relationships, in that a firm's resource signals and institutional factors may influence price premium directly. We tested this alternative model 2 by adding direct links from all five exogenous variables to price premium.
Third, in the hypothesized model, we predict that perceived quality influences prominence. However, the sociological view of reputation suggests that it is also possible that high-status actors and institutional intermediaries set the tone of the evaluations that other stakeholders make (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) . Once these collective processes are set in motion, more prominent organizations may be perceived as having higher quality (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999) . We tested this alternative model 3 by reversing the link between perceived quality and prominence so that prominence predicted perceived quality.
Fourth, one can argue that access to high-quality resources and influential third parties, such as the media and the premier journals, is influenced by the prestige of the university with which a business school is affiliated (Keith & Babchuk, 1998) . Therefore, the prestige of a business school's university may affect both organizational and third-party choices and indirectly influence the reputation and price premiums the business school enjoys (D'Aveni, 1996) . To test this alternative model 4, we added university prestige (as measured by the university-level Gourman score) as a variable directly influencing business school MBA student GMAT scores, faculty academic experience, media rankings, publications in premier journals, and faculty degree prestige. All other aspects of the hypothesized model remained unchanged.
We used the criteria suggested by James et al. (1982) to compare alternative models 1 and 2 to the hypothesized model because they are nested models. In this procedure, a significant reduction in chi-square suggests an improvement in the fit to the data. For alternative model 1, the decrease in chisquare from the hypothesized model to alternative model 1 was not significant (⌬ 2 [5] ϭ 10.91, p Ͼ .05). Thus, alternative model 1 is less parsimonious because it adds more parameters to be estimated and does not fit the data significantly better. Chisquare difference tests contrasting the second alternative model and the hypothesized model also revealed an insignificant decrease (⌬ 2 [5] ϭ 10.93, p Ͼ .05), suggesting that the fit of alternative model 2 to the data was not better than the fit of the hypothesized model.
Alternative models 3 and 4 were not nested in our hypothesized model. Thus, following Kline's (1998) recommendations, to determine whether these alternative models fitted the data better than the hypothesized model, we compared the Akaike information criterion (AIC) scores of each alternative model to the AIC score of the hypothesized model. Kline (1998) suggested that given two nonnested models, the one with the lower AIC score represents the better fit. The AIC scores for alternative models 3 and 4 (78.83 and 260.76, respectively) were both higher than the AIC of the hypothesized model (75.69). Thus, we concluded that the hypothesized model was superior to the alternative models we examined.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we examine two questions that are seldom addressed by reputation researchers but are at the heart of the reputation construct: What factors shape stakeholder perceptions of organizations, and how do different aspects of stakeholder perceptions influence the economic payoffs to organizations? We have addressed these questions by proposing that organizational reputations consist of two dimensions-perceived quality and prominence-and by examining their distinct antecedents and consequences.
Our study makes several important contributions to reputation research. By positing that organizational reputation can be viewed as a two-dimensional construct, we integrate previously disparate branches of research rooted in the economics and institutional perspectives and contribute to reputation research and management practice a model that identifies the antecedents of these two distinct dimensions. Our model also significantly advances current understanding of the relationship between organizational reputation and economic payoffs, which has been the most central concern of reputation research. Because past research has seldom measured reputation itself, and has instead studied the direct relationships between the observable characteristics of firms and price premiums (e.g., Rao, 1994; Shamsie, 2003; Stuart, 2000) , it cannot reveal whether observable organizational and institutional factors affect price premium directly, or do so through reputation, or both (e.g., Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Stuart, 2000) . By measuring reputation directly and by distinguishing between its two dimensions, in this study we were able to assess the contributions that each dimension-perceived quality, and prominence-makes to the economic payoffs an organization reaps. In the context of our study, although perceived quality had no significant relationship with price premium, prominence had the largest total effect on price premium. These results suggest that, viewed as an asset stock, the extent to which an organization is widely recognized in its organizational field strongly influences the economic value of its reputation. Our results also provide empirical support for the theoretical argument that the prominence dimension of reputation depends on support and endorsement by influential third parties, such as institutional intermediaries and high-status actors. We have extended previous research by showing the mechanism through which the media shape the economic outcomes of firms. More specifically, we found that the media indirectly affect price premium by enhancing organizational prominence. In addition, we expand current understanding of the role of expert intermediaries in markets by showing that certifications of a business school faculty's academic merit, reflected in their publications in premier scholarly journals, have a significant effect on a business school's prominence. These findings suggest that receiving recognition from experts in an organizational field may be an important contributor to organizational prominence. In addition, our finding that the prestige of faculty's academic degrees had both a significant direct effect on prominence and a significant total effect on price premium suggests that hiring individuals with high levels of symbolic capital, including but not limited to educational degree prestige, may enable an organization to increase both its prominence and economic payoffs.
In our study, the quality of inputs (student GMAT scores) predicted perceived quality, but the quality of productive assets (faculty average aca-demic experience) did not do so. This difference in effects may occur because different types of resources may have different signaling value to customers, with the quality of inputs having greater signaling value because in the production process inputs transfer their entire value to the final product, while productive assets do not. The difference may also be due to the fact that the quality of productive assets, especially knowledge assets, is complex and hard to observe, therefore reducing their value as a signal that stakeholders can readily use to form expectations about quality. Future research should examine more specifically how the attributes of organizational resources affect their value as signals of quality.
Overall, our findings provide compelling evidence that perceived quality and prominence are predicted by different information signals. This observation suggests the need for future research to examine in greater detail the cognitive processes that underlie the two dimensions of organizational reputation. It is conceivable that judgments of quality are based on specific, relatively detailed observations of signals about firm attributes, while prominence is based on general impressions about an organization that develop largely through social influence (Rao et al., 2000) . Our results also provide evidence that positive evaluations of quality increase prominence and, therefore, may serve as inputs in the collective processes through which prominence develops. Therefore, future research should pursue a finer-grained examination of the different processes of impression formation among stakeholders and how they shape the two dimensions of organizational reputation.
Several limitations of our study also provide excellent opportunities for future research. First, this study focused on a single type of reputation: an organization's reputation with its customers. Since organizations may have multiple reputations with different stakeholder groups (Dollinger et al., 1997) , future research should examine how the two dimensions of reputation we propose affect the economic payoffs associated with different types of reputation, such as reputation with employees or reputation with suppliers. Further, the question of the extent to which an organization's reputation indeed varies along the two dimensions over stakeholder groups is of significant theoretical and practical interest. It is possible that prominence is relatively consistent across different stakeholder groups, whereas perceived quality varies with the varying performance expectations of different stakeholders. Making progress in addressing this question may help reputation research resolve one of its long-standing debates about whether a firm has one reputation or many (D'Aveni, 1996; Fombrun, 1996) . Second, future research should examine the extent to which the economic consequences of the two dimensions depend on the institutional context that surrounds an industry. The organizational field of business schools, which provided the empirical context for the test of our model, may have particularly strong institutional forces, since premier scholarly journals are strongly institutionalized forms for certifying scholarly contribution (Zuckerman, 1988) and media rankings of business schools have a high degree of legitimacy with various stakeholders. In such a context, the effects of prominence on economic payoffs may be stronger than in contexts where institutional intermediaries are less well established or credible. Further, it will be important to examine the extent to which our findings hold in other settings, where rankings are common and pervasive, but product quality is not so difficult for stakeholders to evaluate. In doing so, researchers will be better able to understand the extent to which certification by institutional intermediaries and affiliations with high-status actors substitute for direct evaluations of quality by enabling stakeholders to rely on ready-made interpretations. Progress in that direction has significant implications for understanding how firms should invest in building their reputations and the extent to which they benefit from investing in quality versus investing in media hype and prestigious affiliations.
Third, our study focused on business schools with full-time MBA programs with more than 50 students. The choice of this cut-off was based on arguments in organizational research stating that small and large organizations represent different organizational forms that differ in the problems they deal with and the resource constraints they face (Aldrich, 2000) . In markets with numerous competitors, some small and midsize firms may remain unnoticed by large groups of stakeholders because their lack of prominence places them outside the "consideration set" (Nedungadi, 1990) from which stakeholders ultimately chose to buy. Thus, future research can extend this study by examining the extent to which our model applies to small and midsize firms and how such firms can actually bolster their reputations.
Finally, the uniqueness of our data set limits the study's ability to address how the relationships among the antecedents, dimensions, and consequences of reputation evolve over time. Since our study was based on the first large-scale survey of corporate recruiters with regard to their perceptions of business schools (Wall Street Journal, 2001), we could not examine how the reputations of business schools with this group changed over time. However, in future research scholars can endeavor to compare the impacts of organizational and institutional factors on the sustainability of the two dimensions of reputation and, in turn, the two dimensions' impacts on economic outcomes.
